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Abstract
We present a simpler way than usual to deduce the completeness theorem for the second-order
classical logic from the $rst-order one. We also extend our method to the case of second-order
intuitionistic logic.
c© 2002 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The usual way (but not the original Henkin’s proof [3,4]) for proving the complete-
ness theorem for second-order logic is to deduce it from the completeness theorem for
$rst-order multi-sorted logic [2]. There is clearly a trivial translation from second-order
logic to $rst-order multi-sorted logic, by associating one sort to $rst-order objects and,
for each n∈N, one sort for predicates of arity n.
Another way [12] is to deduce it from the completeness theorem for $rst-order
mono-sorted logic: Van Dalen method’s is to associate a $rst-order variable x to each
second-order variable X of arity n, and encode the atomic formula X (x1; : : : ; xn) by
Apn(x; x1; : : : ; xn) where Apn is a relation symbol of arity n + 1. Then, this coding
is extended to all formulas. We write it F →F∗. However, to allow the transla-
tion between second-order proofs and $rst-order proofs, one adds some axioms to
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discriminate between $rst- and second-order objects. The critical point is the transla-
tion of quanti$cations:
• For $rst-order quanti$cation we de$ne (∀x F)∗=∀x(v(x)→F∗) where v is a new
predicate constant.
• For second-order quanti$cation of arity n we de$ne (∀X n F)∗=∀x(Vn(x)→F∗) where
Vn is a new predicate constant.
Then we add axioms relating v; Vn and Apn such as ∀x∀y(Ap1(x; y)→V1(x)∧ v(y)).
The problem is that this translation is not surjective. So it is not immediate to prove
that if F∗ is provable in $rst-order logic then F is provable in second-order logic,
because all the formulas appearing in the proof of F∗ are not necessarily of the shape
G∗. It is not even clear that the proof in [12] which is only sketched can be completed
into a correct proof (at least the authors do not know how to end his proof). May be
there is a solution using the fact that subformulas of F∗ are nearly of the shape G∗
and one could use this in a direct, but very tedious, proof by induction on the proof
of F using the subformula property which is a strong result.
Our solution, is to simplify Van Dalen’s translation F →F∗ from second-order logic
to $rst-order. The novelty of this paper is to replace Van Dalen’s axiom’s and extra
predicate constant by a coding F →F from $rst-order logic to second-order such that
F∗ and F are logically equivalent. To achieve this we consider that in $rst-order logic
the same variable may have di)erent meanings (in the semantics) depending on it’s
position in atomic formulas. Thus, we can translate any $rst-order formula back to a
second-order formula.
Using this method we can also deduce a de$nition of Kripke models [5] for second-
order intuitionistic logic and easily get a completeness theorem. This models are similar
to Prawitz’s second-order Beth’s models [11,1].
This was not at all so clear with Van Dalen’s method (as we do not know how
to end his proof) if we need classical absurdity to use the extra axioms. We also
give some simple examples showing that despite a complex de$nition, computation is
possible in these models.
2. Coding
Denition 2.1 (Second-order language). Let L2, the language of second-order logic,
be the following:
• The logical symbols ⊥; →; ∧; ∨; ∀ and ∃.
• A countable set V of $rst-order variables: x0; x1; x2; : : : .
• A countable set  of constants and functions symbols (of various arity): a; b; f;
g; h; : : : .
• Using V and  we construct the set of $rst-order terms T: t1; t2; : : : .
• For each n∈N, a countable set Vn of second-order variables of arity n: X n0 ; X n1 ;
X n2 ; : : : .
To simplify, we omit second-order constants (they can be replaced by free
variables).
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Denition 2.2 (First-order language). Let L1, a particular language of $rst-order
logic, be the following:
• The logical symbols ⊥; →; ∧; ∨; ∀ and ∃.
• A countable set V of $rst-order variables: x0; x1; x2; : : : (it is simpler to use the same
set of $rst-order variables in L1 and L2).
• A countable set  of constants and functions symbols (of various arity):
a; b; f; g; h; : : : . Here again we use the same set as for L2.
• For each n∈N, a relation symbol Apn of arity n+ 1.
2.1. Notations
• We write Fv(F) for the set of all free variables of a formula F .
• We write F↔G for (F→G)∧ (G→F).
• We write F[x := t] for the $rst-order substitution of a term.
• We write F[X n :=Y n] for the second-order substitution of a variable.
• We write F[X n :=x1 : : : xnG] for the second-order substitution of a formula.
• We will use natural deduction [9,12] both for second- and $rst-order logic, and we
will write  nkF with k∈{i; c} (for intuitionistic or classical logic) and n∈{1; 2}
(for $rst- or second-order).
We have the following lemma:
Lemma 2.3. If  nk A then, for every substitution ; []nk A[].
Denition 2.4 (Coding). We choose for each n∈N a bijection n from Vn to V. The
fact that it is a bijection for each n is the main point in our method.
Let F be a second-order formula, we de$ne a $rst-order formula F∗ by induction
as follows:
• ⊥∗=⊥.
• (X n(t1; : : : ; tn))∗=Apn(n(X n); t1; : : : ; tn).
• (AB)∗=A∗B∗ where ∈{→; ∧; ∨}.
• (Qx A)∗=Qy(A[x :=y])∗ where y =∈Fv(A∗) and Q∈{∀;∃}.
• (QX n A)∗=Qy(A[X n :=Y n])∗ where n(Y n)=y; y =∈Fv(A∗) and Q∈{∀;∃}.
Remark 2.5. In the coding, the same free $rst-order variable (this will not be the case
for bound ones) has di)erent meanings depending on its location in the translated
formula.
Example 2.6. (∀X (X (x)→X (y)))∗=∀z(Ap1(z; x)→Ap1(z; y)). This example illustrates
why we need renaming. For instance, if 1(X ) were equal to x or y in (X (x)→X (y))∗.
Remark 2.7. The mapping F →F∗ is not surjective, for instance there is no antecedent
for ∀xAp1(x; x) or Ap1(f(a); a).
Denition 2.8 (Comprehension schemas). The second-order comprehension schema
SC2 is the set of all closed formulas SC2(G; x1; : : : ; xn; "1; : : : ; "m) where {x1; : : : ; xn}⊂V,
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Fv(G)⊆{x1; : : : ; xn; "1; : : : ; "m} and
SC2(G; x1; : : : ; xn; "1; : : : ; "m)
= ∀"1 : : :∀"m∃X n∀x1 : : :∀xn(G↔X n(x1; : : : ; xn)) ∈ SC2
where X n =∈Fv(G).
The $rst-order comprehension schema SC1 is de$ned simply as SC∗2 ={F∗; F∈SC2}
It is easy to show that SC2 is provable in second-order logic.
Remark 2.9. Let F=X (x) where 1(X )=x. We have:
• SC2(F ; x;X )=∀X∃Y ∀x(F↔Y (x))∈SC2.
• SC2(F ; x;X )∗=(∀X∃Y ∀x(F↔Y (x)))∗=∀z∃y∀x(Ap1(z; x)↔Ap1(y; x))∈SC1.
It is easy to see that (∀X∃Y ∀x(F↔Y (x)))∗=∀z∃y∀x(F[X :=Z]∗↔Ap1(y; x)) where
1(Z)=z =x.
In general we have the following result: for each second-order formula G there is a
variable substitution  such that
SC2(G; x1; : : : ; xn; "1; : : : ; "m)∗ = (∀"1 : : :∀"m∃X n∀x1 : : :∀xn(G↔X n(x1; : : : ; xn)))∗
= ∀y1 : : :∀ym∃x∀x1 : : :∀xn(G[]∗
↔Apn(x; x1; : : : ; xn)):
We can now show the following theorem (we will not use it):
Theorem 2.10. Let  be a second-order context and A a second-order formula.
If  2k A then ∗; SC1 1k A∗ (k∈{i; c}).
Proof. By induction on the derivation of  2k A, using SC1, Remark 2.9 and Lemma
2.3 for the case of the second-order elimination of ∀ and the second-order introduction
of ∃.
Denition 2.11 (Reverse coding). Let F be a $rst-order formula, we de$ne a second-
order formula F by induction as follows:
• ⊥=⊥,
• Apn(x; t1; : : : ; tn)=X n(t1; : : : ; tn) where X n=−1n (x),
• Apn(t; t1; : : : ; tn)=⊥ if t is not a variable,
• (AB)=AB where ∈{→; ∧; ∨},
• (Qx A)=QxQX i1 : : : QX ipA where Q∈{∀;∃}, X n=−1n (x) for all n∈N, i1¡i2¡
· · ·¡ip and {X i1 ; : : : ; X ip}=Vn∩Fv(A).
Remark 2.12. We do not need renaming in order to de$ne (Qx A) since the n are
bijections.
Lemma 2.13. If A is a second-order formula then 2i A∗↔A.
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Proof. By induction on the formula A.
Remark 2.14. The embarrassing case of decoding Apn(t; t1; : : : ; tn) (where t is not a
variable) never arises here since we only decode encoded formulas. We cannot say that
A∗=A, because in the case of the quanti$er, we can add or remove some quanti$ers
on variables with no occurrence. For instance, if X 0 =Y 0, 0(X 0)=x and 0(Y 0)=y
then (∀X 0 Y 0)∗=(∀xAp0(y))=∀x Y 0.
Corollary 2.15. 2i (SC1)↔ SC2 which means that each formula in (SC1) is equiv-
alent to at least one formula in SC2 and vice versa.
Proof. Consequence of 2.13.
Example 2.16. The aim of this example is to give an idea of the proof of Lemma 2.17.
Let  be a $rst-order context, F=Ap1(x; y)→Ap2(x; y; y)∨Ap1(y; x) and t a term.
We have:
• (∀x F)=∀x∀X 1∀X 2(X 1(y)→X 2(y; y)∨Y 1(x)) and (∃x F)=∃x∃X 1∃X 2(X 1(y)
→X 2(y; y)∨Y 1(x)) (where 1(Y 1)=y).
• If t=z, then (F[x := t])=Z1(y)→Z2(y; y)∨Y 1(z) (where 1(Z1)=2(Z2)=z) and
if t is not a variable, then (F[x := t])= ⊥ → ⊥ ∨Y 1(t)
We remark that:
• (F[x :=z])=Z1(y)→Z2(y; y)∨Y 1(z)=F[X 1 :=Z1][x :=z] if z is a variable such
that 1(Z1)=2(Z2)=z.
• (F[x := t])= ⊥ → ⊥ ∨Y 1(t)=F[X 1 :=x1 ⊥][x := t] if t is not a variable.
and then:
• If  2k (∀x F), then (by using some ∀-elimination rules)  2k (F[x := t]).
• If  2k (F[x := t]), then (by using some ∃-introduction rules)  2k (∃x F)◦.
Lemma 2.17. Let  be a rst-order context and A a rst-order formula. If  1k A
then  2k A (k∈{i; c}).
Proof. By induction on the derivation of  1k A. The only diLcult cases are the case
of the elimination of ∀ and the introduction of ∃ which are treated in the same way
as the Example 2.16.
Now, we can prove the converse of Theorem 2.10, which is the main tool to prove
our completeness theorems:
Theorem 2.18. Let  be a second-order context and A a second-order formula. If
∗; SC1 1k A∗ then  2k A (k∈{i; c}).
Proof. By Lemma 2.17, Corollary 2.15, Lemma 2.13 and using the fact that formulas
in SC2 are provable.
3. Classical completeness
Here is the usual de$nition of second-order models [7,10,12]:
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Denition 3.1 (Second-order classical model). A second-order model for L2 is given
by a tuple M2=(D; M; {Pn}n∈N) where
• D is a non-empty set.
• M contains a function Mf from Dn to D for each function f of arity n in .
• Pn⊆P(Dn) for each n∈N. The set Pn of subsets of Dn will be used as the range
for the second-order quanti$cation of arity n. For n=0, we assume that P0=
P(D0)={0; 1} because P(D0)=P(∅)={∅; {∅}}={0; 1}.
An M2-interpretation  is a function on V∪
⋃
n∈NVn such that (x)∈D for x∈V
and (X n)∈Pn for X n∈Vn.
If  is a M2-interpretation, we de$ne (t) the interpretation of a $rst-order term by
induction with (f(t1; : : : ; tn))= Mf((t1); : : : ; (tn)).
Then if  is a M2-interpretation we de$ne M2;  |= A for a formula A by induction
as follows:
• M2;  |=X n(t1; : : : ; tn) i) ((t1); : : : ; (tn))∈(X n)
• M2;  |=A→B i) M2;  |=A implies M2;  |=B
• M2;  |=A∧B i) M2;  |=A and M2;  |=B
• M2;  |=A∨B i) M2;  |=A or M2;  |=B
• M2;  |=∀x A i) for all v∈D we have M2; [x :=v] |=A
• M2;  |=∃x A i) there exists v∈D such that M2; [x :=v] |=A
• M2;  |=∀X n A i) for all '∈Pn we have M2; [X n :='] |=A
• M2;  |=∃X n A i) there exists '∈Pn such that M2; [X n :='] |=A
We will write M2 |= A if for all M2-interpretation  we have M2;  |=A.
Denition 3.2 (First-order classical model). A $rst-order model for L1 is given by a
tuple M1=(D; M; {(n}n∈N) where
• D is a nonempty set.
• M contains a function Mf from Dn to D for each function f of arity n in .
• (n⊆Dn+1 for each n∈N. The relation (n will be the interpretation of Apn.
An M1-interpretation  is a function from V to D.
For any $rst-order model M1, any $rst-oder formula A and any M1-interpretation ,
we de$ne M1;  |=A et M1 |=A as above by induction on A (we just have to remove
the cases for second-order quanti$cation).
Denition 3.3 (Semantical translation). Let M1=(D; M; {(n}n∈N) be a $rst-order
model. We de$ne a second-order model M1 =(D; M; {Pn}n∈N) where P0={0; 1} and
for n¿0;Pn={|a|n; a∈D} where |a|n={(a1; : : : ; an)∈Dn; (a; a1; : : : ; an)∈(n}.
Let  be an M1-interpretation, we de$ne  an M1 -interpretation by 
(x)=(x)
if x∈V and (X n)= |((X n))|n.
Lemma 3.4. For any rst-order model M1, any M1-interpretation  and any second-
order formula A; M1;  |=A∗ if and only if M1 ;  |=A.
Proof. By induction on the formula A, this is an immediate consequence of the de$-
nition of semantical translation.
Corollary 3.5. For any rst-order model M1, M1 |=SC1 if and only if M1 |=SC2.
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Proof. Immediate consequence of Lemma 3.4 using the fact that formulas in SC1 and
SC2 are closed.
Theorem 3.6 (Completeness of second-order classical semantic). Let A be a closed
second-order formula. 2c A i+ for any second-order model M2 such that
M2 |= SC2 we have M2 |=A.
Proof. (⇒) Usual direct proof by induction on the proof of 2c A.
(⇐) Let M1 be a $rst-order model such that M1 |= SC1. Using Corollary 3.5 we
have M1 |= SC2 and by hypothesis, we get M1 |=A. Then using Lemma 3.4 we have
M1 |=A∗. As this is true for any $rst-order model satisfying SC1, the $rst-order com-
pleteness theorem gives SC1 1c A∗ and this leads to the wanted result 2c A using
Theorem 2.18.
4. Intuitionistic completeness
Our method, when applied to the intuitionistic case, gives the following de$nition
of second-order models (similar to Prawitz’s adaptation of Beth’s models [11]). We
mean that the de$nition arises mechanically if we want to get Lemma 3.4 (which is
the analogous of Lemma 3.4 in the classical case).
Denition 4.1 (Second-order intuitionistic model). A second-order Kripke model for
L2 is given by a tuple K2=(K; 0;6; {Dp}p∈K; { Mp}p∈K; {*n;p}n∈N; p∈K) where
• (K;6; 0) is a partially ordered set with 0 as bottom element.
• Dp are nonempty sets such that for all p; q∈K; p6q implies Dp⊆Dq.
• Mp contains a function Mfp from Dnp to Dp for each function f of arity n in .
Moreover, for all p; q∈K, p6q implies that for all (a1; : : : ; an)∈Dnp ⊆Dnq we have
Mfp(a1; : : : ; an)= Mfq(a1; : : : ; an).
• *n;p are nonempty sets of increasing functions (Pq)q¿p such that for all q¿p; Pq∈
P(Dnq ) (increasing means for all q; q
′¿p, q6q′ implies Pq⊆Pq′). Moreover, if q¿p
and '∈*n;p then ' restricted to all q′¿q belongs to *n;q.
In particular, an element of *0;p is a particular increasing function in {0,1} with
0=∅ and 1={∅}.
A K2-interpretation  at level p is a function  such that (x)∈Dp for x∈V and
(X n)∈*n;p for X n∈Vn.
Remark 4.2. If  is a K2-interpretation at level p and p6q then  can be considered
as K2-interpretation at level q by restricting all the values of second-order variables to
q′¿q. Then we write K2; ; qA even if  is de$ned at a level p6q. This is used
mainly in the de$nition of the interpretation of implication.
Denition 4.3. If  is a K2-interpretation at level p, we de$ne (t) the interpretation
of a $rst-order term by induction with (f(t1; : : : ; tn))= Mfp((t1); : : : ; (tn)).
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Then if  is a K2-interpretation at level p we de$ne K2; ; pA for a formula A
by induction as follows:
• K2; ; pX n(t1; : : : ; tn) i) ((t1); : : : ; (tn))∈(X n)(p)
• K2; ; pA→B i) for all q¿p if K2; ; qA then K2; ; qB
• K2; ; pA∧B i) K2; ; pA and K2; ; pB
• K2; ; pA∨B i) K2; ; pA or K2; ; pB
• K2; ; p∀x A i) for all q¿p, for all v∈Dq we have K2; [x :=v]; qA
• K2; ; p∃x A i) there exists v∈Dp such that K2; [x :=v]; pA
• K2; ; p∀X n A i) for all q¿p, for all '∈*n;q we have K2; [X n :=']; qA
• K2; ; p∃X n A i) there exists '∈*n;p such that K2; [X n :=']; pA
We will write K2 A if for all K2-interpretation  at level 0 we have K2; ; 0A.
Remark 4.4. Interpretations are monotonic, this means that the set of true statements
only increase when we go from world p to world q with p6q.
We recall here the usual Kripke’s de$nition [5] of intuitionistic models:
Denition 4.5 (First-order intuitionistic model). A $rst-order Kripke model is given by
a tuple K1=(K; 0;6; {Dp}p∈K; { Mp}p∈K; {(n;p}n∈N; p∈K;  ) where
• (K;6; 0) is a partially ordered set with 0 as bottom element.
• Dp are nonempty sets such that for all p; q∈K, p6q implies Dp⊆Dq.
• Mp contains a function Mfp from Dnp to Dp for each function f of arity n in .
Moreover, for all p; q∈K, p6q implies that for all (a1; : : : ; an)∈Dnp⊆Dnq we have
Mfp(a1; : : : ; an)=fq(a1; : : : ; an).
• (n;p are subsets of Dn+1p such that for all p; q∈K, for all n∈N, p6q implies
(n;p⊆ (n;q.
•  is the relation de$ned by pApn(a; a1; : : : ; an) if and only if p∈K and
(a; a1; : : : ; an)∈(n;p.
A K1-interpretation  at level p is a function from V to Dp.
For any $rst-order Kripke model K1, any $rst-oder formula A and any K1-inter-
pretation , we de$ne K1; p; A as above.
We will write K1 A i) for K1-interpretation  at level 0 we have K1; ; 0A.
Denition 4.6 (Semantical translation). Let
K1 = (K; 0;6; {Dp}p∈K; { Mp}p∈K; {(n;p}n∈N;p∈K; )
be a $rst-order Kripke model. We de$ne a second-order Kripke model
K1 = (K; 0;6; {Dp}p∈K; { Mp}p∈K; {*n;p}n∈N;p∈K)
where *n;p={|a|n; a∈Dp} with for all q¿p, |a|n(q)={(a1; : : : ; an)∈Dnq ; (a; a1; : : : ;
an)∈(n;q}.
Let  be a K1-interpretation at level p, we de$ne  a K1 -interpretation at level
p by (x)=(x) and (X n)= |((X n))|n.
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Lemma 4.7. For any rst-order Kripke model K1, any K1-interpretation  at level
p and any second-order formula A; K1; ; pA∗ if and only if K1 ; 
; pA.
Proof. By induction on formula A, this is an immediate consequence of the de$nition
of semantical translation.
Corollary 4.8. For any rst-order Kripke modelK1,K1SC1 if and only ifK1 SC2.
Proof. Immediate consequence of Lemma 4.7.
Theorem 4.9 (Completeness of second-order intuitionistic semantic). Let A be a
closed second-order formula. 2i A i+ for all second-order Kripke model K2 such
that K2  SC2 we have K2 A.
Proof. (⇒) Usual direct proof by induction on the proof of 2i A.
(⇐) Identical to the proof of Theorem 3.6 using the Lemmas 4.7 and 4.8 instead
of Lemmas 3.4 and 3.5.
5. Examples of second-order propositional intuitionistic models
In this section, we will only consider propositional intuitionistic logic. Then the
de$nition of models can be simpli$ed using the following remark:
Remark 5.1. The interpretation of a propositional variable at level p can be seen as a
bar: a bar being a set B with
• for all q∈B; q¿p,
• for all q; q′∈B such that q =q′, we have neither q6q′ nor q′6q.
In the case of $nite model, there is a canonical isomorphism between the set of bars
and the set of increasing functions in {0; 1} by associating to a bar B the function '
such that '(q)=1 if and only if there exists r∈B such that q¿r. This usually helps
to “see” the interpretation of a formula.
This is not the case for in$nite model, if we consider Q+, the set of rational greater
than
√
2 is not a bar.
Example 5.2. We will now construct a counter model for the universally quanti$ed
Peirce’s law: P=∀X∀Y (((X →Y )→X )→X ): We take a model K2 with two points
0; p and such that *0;0 contains '1 and '2 de$ned by '1(0)='2(0)='2(p)=0 and
'1(p)=1 (this means that '2 is the empty bar and '1 is then bar {p}). It is clear
that K2; [X :='1; Y :='2]; 01 ((X →Y )→X )→X . So we have K2 1P. We can also
remark that this model is not full the bar {0} is missing.
A natural question arises: if one codes as usual conjunction, disjunction and
existential using implication and second-order universal quanti$cation what seman-
tics is induced by this coding? If we keep the original conjunction, disjunction and
existential, it is obvious that the de$ned connective are provably equivalent to the
original ones, and therefore, have the same semantics.
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However, if we remove conjunction, disjunction and existential from the model we
only have the following:
Proposition 5.3. The semantics induced by the second-order coding of conjunction,
disjunction and existential is the standard Kripke’s semantics if the model is full
(that is if *n;p is the set of all increasing functions with the desired properties).
Proof.
A∧B=∀X ((A→ (B→X ))→X ): We must prove that K2; ; pA∧B if and only if
K2; ; pA and K2; ; pB. The right to left implication is trivial. For the left
to right, we assume K2; ; pA∧B, We consider the interpretation ' de$ned by
'(q)=1 if and only if K2; ; qA and K2; ; qB. Then it is immediate that K2;
[X :=']; pA→ (B→X ).
So we have K2; [X :=']; pX which means that '(p)=1 which is equivalent
to K2; ; pA and K2; ; pB.
A∨B=∀X ((A→X )→ (B→X )→X ): The proof is similar using ' de$ned by '(q)=1
if and only if K2; ; qA or K2; ; qB.
∃" A=∀X (∀"(A→X )→X ): The proof is similar using ' de$ned by '(q)=1 if
and only if there exists  a possible interpretation for " such that K2; [" :=];
qA.
Remark 5.4. If we compare this proof to the proof in [6,8] about data-types in AF2, we
remark that second-order intuitionistic models are very similar to realizability models.
Moreover, in both cases, we are in general unable to compute the semantics of a
formula if the model is not full (for realizability, not full means that the interpretation
of second-order quanti$cation is an intersection over a strict subset of the set of all
sets of lambda terms).
Moreover, the standard interpretation of the conjunction is K; ; pA∧B if and
only if K; ; pA and K; ; pB. However, if the model is not full and if the
language does not contain the conjunction, the function ' de$ned for q¿p by '(p)=1
if and only if K; ; qA and K; ; qB does not always belong to *0;p. In this case,
the interpretation of the second order de$nition of the conjunction is strictly smaller
than the natural interpretation.
It would be interesting to be able to construct such nonstandard model, but this is
very hard (due to the comprehension schemas). In fact the authors do not know any
practical way to construct such a non full model. In the framework of realizability,
such non full model would be very useful to prove that some terms are not typable
of type A in Girard’s system F while they belong to the interpretation of A in all full
models (for instance Maurey’s term for the inf function on natural number).
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